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of the past millennium. It is superficial because
many of the national currencies did not qualify
as “money” in the full sense. There are only a
few “standards of value” that do not need to be
linked to—or defined in terms of—some other
monetary unit. In the same sense that ten “dimes”
or four “quarters” are the same as one U.S. dollar,
many small-country currencies are defined in
terms of the major currency they are tied to.
For the few currencies that do serve as stan-
dards of value, the issuing central banks must
take actions, which collectively are referred to as
“monetary policy.” Such policy actions determine
the “quality” of the money over time. A money’s
quality is inversely related to the quantity of other
real resources that are used in the economy along-
side money to conduct money-type functions. In
places in the world plagued with unstable money,
people spend much of their time getting paid
more frequently, dealing only in cash, making
more frequent purchases, or hiring expensive
THE BASICS OF MONEY
Modern market economies would not be
possible without financial stability. However,
as events around the world in the past decade
demonstrated, financial institutions are not
sound and payments systems are not efficient
when the value of money is not stable. Decades
of experience have demonstrated that prosperity
is undermined when the value of money fluctu-
ates. Stabilizing the value of money has become
the primary, if not the sole, objective of central
banks around the world. This is an essay about
money—both the meaning of the word and the
various ways people have sought over time to
stabilize its value. The importance of stable
money—and the roles of governments and central
banks in providing it—will be presented in a dif-
ferent light than it is in the conventional dialogue.
In a superficial sense, after decades of
increase, the number of “monies” circulating in
the world began to decline during the final decade
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always harms the performance of an economy. Deflations caused by productivity and innovation
can be virtuous. A definition of a non-inflationary environment is set forth. Rapid real growth and
low unemployment cannot cause inflation. There is no trade-off between inflation and employment.
Higher commodity prices or “weak” exchange rates cannot cause inflation. High market interest
rates are a symptom of inflationary policies. Low interest rates are a reflection of successful anti-
inflationary policies, not “easy money.” (JEL E41, E42, E51, E52)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 2006, 88(6), pp. 485-510.
Jerry L. Jordan was the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland from March 1992 to January 2003. Previously, he was director of
research at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. He is a senior fellow at the Fraser Institute and an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.
This article was presented in part as the Homer Jones Lecture, March 8, 2006, in St. Louis Missouri, after being printed in Critical Issues
Bulletin 2005, by the Fraser Institute; sections of the article are reprinted here with permission. The author thanks John Chant, Steve Easton,
and Anna Schwartz for comments on drafts of this article.
© 2006, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Articles may be reprinted, reproduced, published, distributed, displayed, and transmitted in
their entirety if copyright notice, author name(s), and full citation are included. Abstracts, synopses, and other derivative works may be made
only with prior written permission of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
 money managers and financial advisers. That is,
having money of lower quality means that more
time, effort, and resources are employed in gather-
ing information about relative prices and conduct-
ing transactions. Those resources could have been
used to raise the “potential output” of the econ-
omy, which is the social payoff for policies that
maintain sound money. The frequently referred
to, but little understood, “cost of inflation” is the
loss of output over time resulting from deteriora-
tion of the quality of money.
The Nature of Money
My very great teachers (Alchian, 1977; Brunner
and Meltzer, 1971) taught that a society uses as
money that entity that economizes best on the
use of other real resources to gather information
about relative prices and to conduct transactions.
This makes clear that the common—but wrong—
statement of Gresham’s Law about “bad money”
driving out “good money” needs to be restated.
What we have observed through the millennia
is that high-confidence monies drive out low-
confidence monies (Hayek, 1976, p. 29; Mundell,
1998).
Sometimes economists treat money as a factor
of production that is separate from, and in addi-
tion to, land, labor, or capital. This is not a useful
way to think about the role of money in society.
It is derived from—and maybe reinforces—the
idea that there must be enough money in circula-
tion to “meet the needs of trade.” A more fruitful
way to think about the role of money in a market
economy is one in which sound money liberates
resources, especially resources used to gather
information and to conduct private transactions.
This view draws attention to the importance of
the quality of money. That money facilitates trans-
actions appears to be clear to everyone; its role
in enhancing market knowledge about relative
prices, however, is less well understood.
Money’s effectiveness depends largely on its
quality. The quality of money is high when the
value of money is stable. Money prices provide
households and businesses with reliable informa-
tion about the relative costs of goods and services.
They can make sound economic decisions and
this, in turn, fosters economic prosperity.
The economic efficiency that comes from a
stable monetary unit of account is one of the
pieces of a Hayekian infrastructure that a market
economy requires. That is, a market economy
requires a foundation of enforceable property
rights, generally accepted accounting principles,
sound financial institutions, and a stable currency.
Where public contracts are not honored and
private contracts are not enforced, markets are
impaired. Where title to property is not certain,
normal banking is not possible. Where financial
statements are not reliable, investment opportu-
nities are obscured. Where the purchasing power
of money is not stable, resources are wasted in
gathering information or are tied up (hoarded)
as stores of value are used in producing and con-
suming the wrong things.
Money, Prices, and Income
The prices of things people buy and sell and
in which they invest are expressed in terms of
money units. Changes in the money prices of
goods and assets convey information. If an econ-
omy’s monetary unit is known to be a stable stan-
dard of value, then changes in money prices will
accurately reflect changes in the relative values
of goods and assets. That is, price fluctuations
signal changes in the demand for, and supply of,
goods and assets; resources are then shifted toward
more valued uses and away from those less valued.
This is essential in order for the economy to
achieve the most economically efficient aggregate
output. In other words, standards of living will be
highest when all price changes can be interpreted
as relative price changes. Similarly, all changes
in interest rates would be changes in real interest
rates—a reflection of changes in people’s prefer-
ences about time, changes in the pace of innova-
tion, or changes in the economy’s endowment of
productive resources.
Unfortunately, in the world of fiat money,1
one can never be absolutely certain that observed
changes in the prices of specific things or changes
in interest rates reflect real events such as crop
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1 Irredeemable paper currency that does not rest on a specie basis
such as gold but derives its purchasing power from the declaratory
fiat of the government issuing it.failures, so mistakes are made in the allocation
of productive resources. As a consequence, the
well-being of the society is less than optimal. A
form of monetary static (like a distracting noise)
in the pricing of goods and services occurs when
the standard of value—money—does not mean
the same thing over time. This static means the
signals that are coming to decisionmakers from
observed price changes cannot be relied upon with
certainty when the use of productive resources
is shifting.
In economies where changes in money prices
are contaminated by the changing purchasing
power of money, false signals are being sent to
businesses and households. Bad decisions are
being made, and resources are being misallocated.
Standards of living—real incomes—fail to rise at
their potential rate. Nominal interest rates (that
is, the kind you see quoted every day) respond to
shifting expectations about the future purchasing
power of money. Changes in real interest rates are
obscured, so resources are misallocated. Since
saving and investment decisions are affected,
growth is impaired.
The objective of monetary policy is to mini-
mize the misinformation associated with the
constantly changing (relative) prices of things.
Absence of inflation is the ideal condition in
which businesses and households make all deci-
sions based on the assumption that all price
changes currently observable or expected in the
future are relative price changes; that is, they
reflect changes in the underlying demand for, or
supply of, everything. Naturally, if all price changes
are relative price changes, for every observed or
expected rise or decline in some prices there must
be corresponding price declines and rises in other
prices.2 For this condition to prevail, people—
while they know that some prices will rise and
others will fall—must anticipate that on balance
they are safe in assuming the monetary standard—
money—will buy the same universal array of
goods over time. When innovation occurs and
new goods are invented, the average well-being
of the society is improved but not because the
information content of money has changed.
Innovation involves “creative destruction”—the
economic value of something old is reduced by
the discovery of a new product or more efficient
way of producing the old product. Relative prices
change; a market system treats such changes as
signals that resources are better used by shifting
away from the old and toward the new.
A real increase in particular prices or wages
occurs when there is a shift in demand away from
some other good or factor input3 and toward that
good or factor. When “improved efficiency” means
discovering ways of using the same amount of
labor but less of other factor inputs to produce
the same output, a real wage gain occurs. In such
a circumstance, observed wage increases would
be associated with decreases in output prices to
the extent that the quantity of the good produced
increases as a result of the improved productivity.
An innovation that generally improves pro-
ductivity in an economy will be associated with
higher real returns to productive capital (includ-
ing human resources such as labor). The resulting
increase in observed interest rates—which are
themselves relative prices and subject to change—
is a part of the mechanism by which resources
are bid to their higher-valued uses. As will be
discussed later, if governmental (monetary) poli-
cies sought to prevent the market from bidding
up interest rates, the resulting expansion of the
central bank’s balance sheet would cause monetary
units to be created at a more rapid rate than people
desire to add to their stocks of money balances.
The effects would be observed in an acceleration
of aggregate spending growth as people seek to
exchange the excess balances for things they pre-
fer. The bidding of the excess money units for
other things causes the money prices to rise—
more money units to acquire the same thing. Price
signals are then distorted by the falling purchasing
power of the money used in the economy.
The challenges to monetary policymakers in
formulating and implementing policy actions to
minimize inflation or deflation will be discussed
in some detail below. Here, the important point
is that frequent changes in the prices of things
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2 Appropriately weighted.
3 Economists refer to the materials used to make things—wood,
metal, plastics, etc.—as “factor inputs.”and changes in market interest rates are normal
occurrences in a market economy, and an under-
standing of how and why they are changing is
important to both policymakers and the rest of us.
Inflation
It would be hard to get agreement on a defini-
tion of inflation and even more difficult to get
agreement on an acceptable measure of inflation.
We have chosen instead to define the conditions
that would prevail when there is an absence of
inflation or deflation. Common usage of the term
“inflation” is misleading because it confuses
cause and effect. Often people think that inflation
occurs because “prices are rising.” But, that is too
simple. Such a diagnosis often leads naive politi-
cians to think the appropriate prescription is either
to put controls in place to prevent prices of things
from going up; or they think the task is to ensure
that incomes rise at least as rapidly so that stan-
dards of living do not erode. Both prescriptions
are wrong.
“To inflate” certainly means “to make larger,”
but what is increasing is the number of money
units required to purchase the same basket of
goods over time. The diagnosis should be that
money units are being created at a faster rate than
people want to add to their holdings of them.
“Too much money chasing too few goods” is the
familiar cause of inflation. The appropriate pre-
scription is to avoid creating money at a pace that
is faster than people want to add to their money
balances. How policymakers seek to do this is
discussed in the boxed insert.
The obvious political risk of talking as though
inflation means that prices of things and people’s
wages are rising is that people come to fear that
policymakers are out to deny them the well-
deserved wage increase or higher price for their
products that other people seem willing to pay.
Public surveys reveal that people form ideas about
inflation based on prices of things they buy. They
rarely see higher prices of things they sell as any-
thing other than just rewards for their labors.
The expressions “price stability” or “stable
prices” are not more helpful. Prices of things—
both goods for current consumption and invest-
ment assets—are constantly changing. All
innovation implies lower (relative) prices for
previous goods and technology. The familiar
pattern for all newly introduced goods is for their
prices to fall as methods of production and distri-
bution are improved and as economies of scale
are achieved. Conversely, as wealth rises, people
spend a declining share of their income on certain
“necessities” and larger shares of their income
on goods thought of as luxuries. Such shifts in
consumption patterns may be associated with
rising prices of the more sought-after goods. These
are natural manifestations of a market economy.
It would be highly undesirable to have—and to
have policies designed to maintain—stable prices.
People know very well that the money prices
of some things will rise (cars, concert tickets,
impressionist paintings, greens fees, tuition, etc.)
even though they cannot be sure by how much.
Money prices of other things will fall (refrigerators,
telephone calls, computers, televisions, VCRs,
carpets, microwave ovens, etc.), even though they
cannot be sure by how much. Most of the time for
most things (food, gasoline, clothing, prescription
drugs, etc.) they cannot be too certain whether
the money prices in the future will be higher or
lower. Such uncertainties cannot be eliminated
from a market economy. As a consequence, people
have always chosen to use as money (subject to
the effectiveness of criminal prohibitions by
governments) the entity that their own experience
suggests is more likely to be exchangeable in the
future for known quantities of things they desire.
Uncertainty about present and future relative
values of things is precisely why people hold
money balances at all. When alternatives are
available, they will choose to use as money the
currency they are least uncertain about with
respect to future money prices. Because people
know they get hurt by inflation, for over 40 years—
from the 1930s to the 1970s—the U.S. government
made it illegal for American citizens to hold gold
as a way of protecting themselves.
Time and other resources are required to
shop—to gather information about relative prices
of various goods, services, and investment assets.
People will naturally prefer to use the monetary
units that economize best on the use of their time
and productive resources to gather information
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In recent decades, the world has had ample oppor-
tunity to observe ordinary people in Latin America,
the former Soviet Republics, and central Europe
choose to use U.S. dollars (and, increasingly,
euros) rather than the currency supplied by their
own governments. Obviously, they do so based
on an expectation that the information available
to them regarding the relative values of things is
more reliable when denominated in dollars than
in rubles, pesos, dinars, or bahts!
Bad experiences have taught most people that
neither inflation nor deflation enhances economic
performance. What also occurs, but is not as easy
to observe, is that unanticipated inflations and
deflations induce redistributions of wealth—
especially between debtors and creditors—but
they leave the average standard of living lower.
According to a former Governor of the Federal
Reserve, “a place that tolerates inflation is a place
where no one tells the truth.” He meant, of course,
that true changes in the relative values of things
cannot be observed from stated prices when the
purchasing power of money is not stable. 
An appropriate policy with regard to money
would be to create the institutional arrangements
that minimize the uncertainty that people encoun-
ter about the money prices both of goods available
for current consumption and of investment assets.
Individuals not only want to exchange the pro-
ceeds of their current labors for immediate con-
sumption, they want to minimize uncertainty
about their future ability to exchange various
savings and investment assets for subsequent
consumption. The types of money that exhibit
the best track records for minimizing these infor-
mation costs will be the preferred monies.
Money and Interest Rates
A confusion arising from the popular usage
of the word “money” is that bankers claim to
lend money and bank customers claim to borrow
Jordan
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MONEY IS NOT INCOME
As noted earlier, even the word “money” cannot be used without ambiguity. It would be hard
to find anyone who would admit to having more money than they want. But, their behavior suggests
otherwise. Every purchase or investment involves a reduction in money holdings. Acquiring
money balances requires selling something or spending at a slower rate relative to cash income.
The confusion comes from the unfortunate popular habit of using the word money to mean income
or wealth. It is natural for humans to desire more income—ability to consume. Money is the means
by which indirect exchange takes place. It is a good that is held for the services it renders. Like
any other good, a person can certainly be holding more money balances than desired relative to
other things. When one’s money balances are judged to be too large, disposing of excess money
in favor of some thing is the least costly adjustment one can make.
In truth though, people do not normally desire to hold something simply because society treats
it as money. Rather, they desire to have available claims to consumption—they want to buy things.
Naturally, how much they can buy will depend on the prices of things in money units, so the
amount of money they hold will depend on how much they expect things to cost. They form their
expectations about how much things will cost in the future based on the experiences they have
had in the past. If they generally have observed that the money prices of virtually everything they
buy are always rising—a condition usually referred to as inflation—they are rational in thinking
that will also be the case in the future. Under such circumstances, their current money holdings
will be, on average, smaller than if they thought that the money prices of at least some of the things
they want to buy will be lower in the future.money. But, people do not increase their indebted-
ness in order to hold greater idle cash balances!
The extension of credit by financial intermediaries
does not alter the amount of money in the economy.
Nevertheless, the unfortunate expressions—
“borrowing money” and “lending money”—
contribute to an erroneous idea about the
relationship between the “amount of money” and
observed interest rates. People (and their elected
representatives) believe that interest rates would
be lower if only there were more money avail-
able. This Ptolemaic view of the world persists
even in the face of much sad experience that
countries “enjoying” rapid money growth have
high interest rates.
People hold a variety of financial assets—in
addition to money—as stores of value. Often these
assets are claims to certain amounts of money
units at various times in the future. But, they do
not want a certain amount of money in the future.
They want to buy things. If they think the prices
of things they will want to buy in the future will
be higher, they know they will have to have more
money units. Being able to earn higher interest
rates on their assets is one way of having the
greater amount of money that will be required by
the expected higher prices of things. By the same
token, borrowers of money are willing to pay
higher interest rates if they expect their invest-
ments to generate larger volumes of money units
as the money prices of things rise. 
There is a common fallacy that “low” interest
rates can “cause inflation” and that “high” interest
rates are part of the solution. This is completely
backward. When people—both businesses and
households—start to anticipate that prices will be
rising faster in the future, they make adjustments.
Sometimes they make purchases sooner than
otherwise to “get ahead” of the price rise. They
may even go into debt to do so. They also seek to
minimize any “idle balances” they hold in the
form of cash or low-yielding balances in their
checking accounts. But, while one family or one
business may reduce its money holdings, the econ-
omy cannot do so. Actions by anyone to spend
or invest only increases someone else’s money
balances. If everyone is trying to do the same
thing, prices of goods and assets will get bid up—
the real purchasing power of money falls—and
higher interest rates will have to be offered to
induce people to hold—rather than spend—the
stock of money in circulation.
These market dynamics explain why higher
interest rates are always and everywhere observed
in the places where the value of money is falling
fastest, while the lowest interest rates are observed
where money is holding its value. There is only
one monetary policy that can produce low interest
rates: a policy of stable money. Once people start
to expect the value of money to erode—the average
of money prices to rise—observed interest rates
can also be expected to rise. Any attempts to resist
these natural market dynamics artificially will
only make matters worse. 
Even when businesses and households in an
economy expect the value of money to be stable
over time, there will be fluctuations in interest
rates that reflect the changing pace of innovation,
agricultural developments, natural disasters, wars,
and other real events. Monetary authorities cannot
avoid the need to analyze the forces tending to
alter interest rates. Those market dynamics ema-
nating from a monetary imbalance must be
responded to. Errors in interpreting the forces
operating to change interest rates has been the
most common source of mistakes in the formula-
tion of monetary policies in the modern world.
Money and Exchange Rates
People in every modern economy buy things
from, and sell things to, people in other countries.
How much they have to pay when they buy and
how much they can get when they sell depends
on the exchange rate between the domestic money
and the money of the other country. The exchange
rate between any two currencies depends on many
things, including the inflation rates of each coun-
try and “acts of God” in one of the countries. 
Wealth gains and losses in one country can
result from changes in the exchange rate caused
by developments in the other. When international
terms of trade are altered by foreign develop-
ments—wars, agricultural conditions, etc.—there
are redistributional effects in the domestic econ-
omy: The effects on import-competing firms is
opposite to that on exporting firms, and the prices
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non-tradable goods. Furthermore, asset prices are
influenced differently than goods prices. In all,
many prices are affected, in different directions,
with some people being positively or negatively
affected relative to other people. None of these
developments, though, has any certain effect on
the stability of the domestic currency.
Even though price indices that include foreign
goods—and domestic goods that compete with
foreign goods—may increase or decrease as a con-
sequence of international developments, it is not
correct to identify such statistical observations
as inflation or deflation. A shortfall of the coffee
crop will influence coffee prices in importing
countries. And, to the extent consumers pay the
higher prices, they will experience a real income
loss and consequently will purchase less of other
things. What is observed is the higher price of
coffee in the price statistics. What is not so readily
observable is the associated lower demand for,
and prices of, other things compared with what
otherwise would have occurred. Relative prices
have changed, but the average of prices depends
on the income and substitution effects and the
choices people make.
It is common—but wrong—for someone to
say that “higher inflation is caused by higher
costs of imports such as oil.” What is true is that
misinterpretation of a “price shock” caused by a
change in the external exchange rate or by a real
event such as a sudden drop in oil production
can result in a mistake in monetary policy. Such
misinterpretations and policy mistakes have fre-
quently resulted in inflations (and deflations) that
could have been avoided.
Money, Growth, and Employment
Contrary to simple intuition, one often sees
news reports suggesting that “too much” economic
growth will reduce the purchasing power of
money—will “cause inflation,” in familiar lan-
guage. Yet, every person knows that a bumper crop
of anything will yield lower prices and a poor
harvest will be followed by higher prices. It is
simply not logical (or correct) to argue that an
increase in production will foster a general rise
of prices. Concerns that faster total growth of out-
put in the economy will cause a fall in the pur-
chasing power of money—inflation—are simply
wrong.4 Similarly, it is false to say that “too many
people working” or “too low unemployment” can
“cause inflation.”5
Market economies have an inherent tendency
to grow. How much growth occurs depends on
incentives for working, for achieving productive
efficiencies, and for introducing new products.
In addition to tax laws and regulation, economic
policies influence these incentives by fostering a
monetary regime that provides reliable informa-
tion about the relative values of productive
resources, both in the present and in the future.
That happens only when the monetary unit
employed by the economy is of known and stable
value. Anything less than stable money gives inac-
curate signals about relative values, so resources
are not allocated to their most productive uses.
Growth, consequently, is less than it would be if
money prices could be relied upon to reflect rela-
tive underlying supplies of, and demands for,
productive resources accurately.
Money and Productivity
Traditionally, economists talk about things
being produced using some combinations of land,
labor, and capital, where capital is taken to mean
tools, machines, buildings, and so on. Productiv-
ity—productive efficiency—improves when the
same output can be obtained with less of at least
one of these inputs. As noted earlier, economists
sometimes include “money” in the production
function, as a factor of production that is in addi-
tion to land, labor, and capital. As such, the
quantity of money appears to be an alternative to
(or maybe in addition to) lumber, copper, workers,
or other factors. This unfortunate way of thinking
about the role of money in the economy tends to
be derived from—and maybe to reinforce—notions
that there is “not enough money” in circulation.
Such a false diagnosis is dangerous because it
usually is accompanied by a prescription that
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4 For a discussion of why rapid growth does not cause inflation,
see Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2000).
5 For further discussion of these issues, see Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland (1999).the monetary authorities can make people better
off by creating money units at a faster rate. That
is certainly wrong.
It is easy to imagine, and probably common,
for the lending officer of a bank to respond to a
customer’s request to borrow more funds by say-
ing, “I would like very much to lend you some
(more) money but the central bank is making credit
very tight and I have no more to lend…how about
golf on Sunday?” The would-be borrower is left
with the impression that the currently available
stock of money is already being “used” by some-
body else and that the central bank is preventing
him from expanding his business by failing to
increase the total availability of money. A popular
(but wrong) conclusion is that the output of the
economy is being restrained by the inadequacy
of money growth.
The alternative way to think about the role of
money is that improving the quality of money
reduces the use of other real productive resources
employed in the task of gathering information
about relative values and conducting transactions
and, therefore, increases the productive potential
of the economy. That is, instead of being a supple-
ment to other productive resources, money that
is more stable liberates such resources from being
employed in activities associated with uncertain-
ties that exist when the purchasing power of
money is unstable. When the form of money avail-
able in the economy is not reliable—that is, its
purchasing power over time is not stable—some
of other resources will be employed in dealing
with the uncertainties. As monetary policies to
stabilize the currency start to become effective
and credible, other resources can be redeployed
in more productive ways. In the end, the produc-
tive potential of the economy is greatest when
the fewest of other resources are utilized in per-
forming tasks for which money is intended—
gathering information about relative values and
conducting transactions. 
From this analysis it should be clear that a
monetary shock—an unanticipated change in the
availability of money—would reduce the poten-
tial output of the economy. That is because the
actions taken by businesses and households to
readjust their actual money balances to desired
levels will cause unavoidable changes in relative
prices and the average level of all prices and, thus,
introduce uncertainty into the economy. Naturally,
such increased uncertainty causes resources to
be committed to hedging, arbitrage, and specula-
tion. Furthermore, since the quality of price
information is diminished, mistakes will be made
in interpreting signals about real demands for, and
supplies of, goods and services. Overproduction
of some things and underproduction of other
things will mean that society’s well-being is less
than it could be.
Resources flow to their highest-valued uses
only when the changing prices of things reflect
shifts in fundamental real demands for, and sup-
plies of, goods, services, and productive resources.
Monetary disturbances introduce price changes
that mask these fundamental forces. Consequently,
excess production of some things and shortages
of other things can occur simultaneously. 
In a world with stable population and a given
set of goods and services where no new products
are invented, one would expect the money prices
of final goods to gradually decline at the same
pace as the improving productive efficiency of
the economy’s resources. The gains in wealth to
the society from the higher productivity would
be distributed to inhabitants in the form of “higher
real incomes.” That is, their unchanged money
incomes would gradually command a larger basket
of goods as increased availability of goods and
services pressed down on money prices. This
“productivity norm” (Selgin, 1990 and 1997) for
the average of money prices can be thought of as
a static baseline for the purchasing power of
money: It would tend to rise in an expanding
economy. It neglects population growth, labor
force participation rates, introduction of new
products, external trade, and distortions arising
from tax structures and regulation. Nevertheless,
it describes how people in an economy benefit
from a stable currency.6
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6 “An increase in the quantity of goods produced...must bring about
an improvement in people’s conditions. Its consequence is a fall
in the money prices of the goods...But such a fall in money prices
does not in the least impair the benefits derived from the additional
wealth produced...But one must not say that a fall in prices caused
by an increase in the production of the goods concerned is the
proof of some disequilibrium which cannot be eliminated otherwise
than by increasing the quantity of money” (Mises, 1949, p. 431).It is important to note that a condition of
“rising purchasing power of money” is most com-
monly described by the pejorative “deflation.”
This unfortunate custom has caused most
observers to believe that a gradually falling “price
level” is as bad, or even worse than, a gradually
rising “price level.” Our analysis concludes there
can be—and historical experience has demon-
strated—“virtuous deflations” during periods of
rapidly rising productivity.7
Money and Innovation
People can readily observe the effects of the
introduction of new or better products: The money
prices of old goods fall. The phenomenon is most
obvious in examples such as computers. The
availability of faster machines reduces the demand
for, and therefore the prices of, slower models.
The new availability of improved software, better
fabrics, longer-lasting tires, compact disks with
more capacity, and so on is accompanied by lower
prices of the products they replace. But, if radial
tires are cheaper and last longer than the bias tires
they replace, it means people are richer as their
incomes will acquire a higher standard of living.
That, in turn, means they can consume more of
something else. The increased demand for other
things that is made possible by the availability
of cheaper tires means the money prices of other
things will be higher. Thus, while prices are not
stable, the role played by money is unchanged.
That is, the value of money can be stable even
though the money prices of things must be chang-
ing in an expanding economy.
As is the case with increased efficiency in
producing existing products discussed above, the
benefits of greater wealth influence prices in
two ways: (i) lower prices of less desirable older
products and (ii) higher real incomes as a conse-
quence of the lower prices of the goods that are
superseded, allowing greater demand for—and
higher prices of—other goods. If the pace of
innovation is rapid and totally new products as
well as improved products are introduced very
frequently, the pace of obsolescence of old prod-
ucts must also be rapid. In such a regime, one
would expect to see frequent and significant
declines of not only the prices of the inferior
products but also the capital stock that produces
them. That is, “creative destruction” implies
falling prices of both goods and productive assets
that are superseded by superior products. If such
is not observed, it is evidence that the purchasing
power of the currency is not stable.
Countries and Monies
There are many currencies in the world
today—more than 100. There are only a few stan-
dards of value—fewer than a dozen. A hundred
years ago there was only one standard of value—
gold—but already many national currency units.
A dominant trend of the past century was the
proliferation of national currencies, especially as
new nation-states emerged from the breakup of
the colonial empires and the Soviet Union. It
seemed that one criterion of nationhood was a
national currency. That trend may well have been
reversed as the century ended.
The dominant monetary system among
colonies was one that relied on currency boards
for establishing monetary stability (Schwartz,
1993). The newly formed nations, however, aban-
doned the currency-board system for a number of
reasons. Currency boards lost their standing as
valuable institutions for establishing monetary
stability after World War II because of the dramatic
change in conventional intellectual beliefs, espe-
cially the erosion of the legitimacy of imperialism.
Perhaps more significant, however, was the pre-
vailing belief that a central bank, with discretion,
would outperform a rule-bound currency board.
Aside from national pride, the idea that a
nation-state should have its own currency and
independent monetary policy was intellectually
supported by the idea that some positive rate of
inflation was optimal. Even when economists
would not defend deliberate debasement of the
currency, authorities often rationalized inflation
on grounds of political necessity, especially in
the face of often large and growing national debts.
The political expediency of the “unlegislated tax
of inflation” seemed for a while to have had a near
universal appeal. Over time, the political benefits
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7 For more discussion of types of deflations, see Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland (2002).of deliberate inflation have been counterbalanced
by financial innovations in domestic and global
markets. In fact, the balance appears now to have
shifted such that the costs associated with rising
inflation outweigh any residual benefits. First
central bankers, then ministers of finance, and
finally politicians generally are finding that a
reputation for tolerance of inflation is undesirable.
Twenty-five years ago, it was fairly common
to hear even prominent, well-respected econo-
mists argue the merits of a weak external value
of the national currency (devaluation) in order to
gain some presumed competitive advantage over
trading partners. Such notions now seem increas-
ingly quaint. It is now unimaginable that a politi-
cian anywhere would achieve success by arguing
that accelerating inflation and a weak currency
would benefit local constituents. Much of what
has happened in recent years perhaps reflects the
rise in so-called “financial market vigilantism,”
which imposes a level of discipline not anticipated
years ago. 
Neither monetary sovereignty nor independent
monetary policy is deemed to be worth very much
in today’s global financial markets. Moreover,
seigniorage is quite small in a noninflationary
world. Hence, it is becoming more widely under-
stood that any net benefits associated with main-
taining a national central bank and a national
currency are quite small. Increasingly, the behav-
ior of businesses and households around the world
has included the pragmatic adoption of standards
of value that serve their purposes irrespective of
national origin. For a couple of decades, the people
of the former Yugoslav republics used the Deutsche
mark as their preferred monetary standard for
the same reason that people in many countries
around the world use the U.S. dollar. A reputation
for stability of purchasing power means more to
the consumer than the local content or national
origin of the currency. As we have seen in the case
of consumer goods, when the barriers to the free
importation and use of products and services of
superior quality are removed, people pragmati-
cally choose quality and performance over patri-
otic gestures.
Reflecting these forces, the importation of
monetary policy from another country has been
a growing trend in recent years. Just a few years
ago, 11 sovereign countries of Western Europe
implemented their plan to shift monetary policy
decisionmaking from the autonomous national
central banks to a newly created supranational
central bank and phased out the 11 national cur-
rencies in favor of a single monetary standard to
be used by all. Soon other countries started giving
up any notions of monetary autonomy and a
national currency. Ecuador and El Salvador are
examples of countries that have joined others in
unilaterally adopting the U.S. dollar as their offi-
cial standard of value.
GOVERNMENTS AND MONEY
We do not pretend, that a National Bank can
establish and maintain a sound and uniform
state of currency in the country, in spite of the
National Government; but we do say that it has
established and maintained such a currency,
and can do so again, by the aid of that Govern-
ment; and we further say, that no duty is more
imperative on that Government, than the duty
it owes the people, of furnishing them a sound
and uniform currency.
—Abraham Lincoln (1839)
Abraham Lincoln connected sound banking
with political liberty, affirming that government
has both the ability and the obligation to provide
a stable currency. His belief in the importance of
a sound currency has been shared by most thinkers
for the past 250 years. Lincoln’s view that govern-
ment would actually provide a stable currency,
however, has enjoyed less acceptance. Skepticism
about the government’s role with regard to money
has been the dominant view since the founding of
the republic. These doubts are well summarized
by the prominent twentieth-century economist
Ludwig von Mises:
Whatever a government does in the pursuit of
aims to influence the height of purchasing
power depends necessarily upon the ruler’s
personal value judgments. It always furthers
the interests of some people at the expense of
other groups. It never serves what is called the
commonweal or the public welfare. (Mises,
1949, p. 422)
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specified a stable currency, but as James Buchanan
observed, such provisions have been inadequate:
This framework role for government also was
considered to include the establishment of a
monetary standard, and in such fashion as to
insure predictability in the value of the desig-
nated monetary unit. (It is in the monetary
responsibility that almost all constitutions have
failed, even those that were allegedly motivated
originally by classical liberal precepts. Govern-
ments, throughout history, have almost always
moved beyond constitutionally authorized
limits of their monetary authority.) (Buchanan,
1994, p. 4)
Debates about Money
History is unfortunately replete with examples
of governments trying to print money in order to
finance their expenditures. Friedrich von Hayek,
winner of the 1974 Nobel Prize in Economic
Sciences, puts it this way: “History is largely a
history of inflation, and usually of inflations
engineered by governments and for the gain of
governments” (1976, p. 29). In recent times, the
hyperinflation of Germany in the 1920s and of
Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil in the 1980s are all
examples of governments debasing their curren-
cies and engaging in what Mises called “a fraudu-
lent attempt to cheat the public” (1949, p. 782).
Until the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, there was little disagreement that a stable
currency was best; the debate centered on how
to provide it. Following World War II, the notion
that some inflation might be desirable (or at least
should be tolerated) entered debates about public
policy for a relatively short time. But, after painful
inflation experiences in the 1960s and 1970s, the
question of whether to eliminate inflation is no
longer widely debated.
In the closing years of the millennium, the
problem of how to provide a stable value of money
regained prominence. Alternative approaches to
stabilizing currencies were pursued around the
world, and public-policy debates returned to this
issue because people were rethinking the role of
government in their societies. The monetary
institutions likely to appear during the twenty-first
century will reflect the dynamic economic and
political processes currently at work. It remains
to be seen whether nations achieve and maintain
stable currencies because of government, as
Abraham Lincoln believed, or in spite of govern-
ment, as thinkers as diverse as James Madison,
Mises, and Hayek contended. 
The sentiment that government powers should
be constrained by constitutional design is certainly
not unique to the monetary arena. For example,
James Madison set forth principles of government
that underscore his views on money. In his elabo-
ration of the “rule of law,” he comments, “To trace
the mischievous effects of a mutable government
would fill a volume” (Madison, 1977 [1788]). His
doubts about elected representatives’ ability to
provide a stable currency are reflected clearly in
his adherence to a specie (gold or silver) standard.
Madison’s defense of an exclusive role of Congress
boils down to a distrust of populist sentiments:
“A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,
for an equal division of property, or for any other
improper or wicked project, will be less apt to
pervade the whole body of the Union than a par-
ticular member of it” (Madison, 1977 [1787]).
The history of money over the past two cen-
turies shows the world groping for different
institutional structures that limit governments’
temptations to debase money in order to satisfy
some short-sighted political objectives. The
approaches used in the past have been functions
of the nature of money prevailing at the time and
of societies’ views about the proper role of govern-
ment. The approaches used in this century will
surely be different from those of the past two if
either of these two factors changes materially. In
particular, while government will surely have
some responsibility in providing a stable currency,
government’s exact role should not be taken for
granted. 
Historical Views of Money. Adam Smith
defined the role of money as a medium of
exchange, describing it as “the great wheel of
circulation” (Smith, 1976 [1776], p. 309). How-
ever, money functions in at least two other ways:
as a store of value and as a standard of value
(unit of account). When we hold money, we trust
that it will largely maintain its worth. If the value
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of inflation, the ability of money to serve as a
store of value is seriously hampered. As a unit
of account, money serves as a measuring stick,
telling us how many units of something exchange
for a unit of money.8
An often-overlooked consideration is that,
while money is an integral part of society because
of its service of these three roles, it is not desired
for its own sake. Smith pointed out: 
No complaint, however, is more common than
that of a scarcity of money. Money, like wine,
must always be scarce with those who have
neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to
borrow it… It is not for its own sake that men
desire money, but for the sake of what they can
purchase with it. (1976 [1776], pp. 458-60)
This confusion between more money and
more purchasing power has contributed in large
part to the pervading lack of trust in the provision
of money by government. As Mises suggests,
governments are often tempted to answer the cry
for more purchasing power by simply creating
more money. But in so doing, the opposite effect
is achieved—the purchasing power of money is
actually reduced. The result, as Alchian and Allen
explain, is inflation: “a rise in the number of dol-
lars required to purchase a given standard of liv-
ing” (1977, p. 484). If inflation makes individuals
uncertain about what to ask or what to give for
goods or services, then the quality of money dete-
riorates, reducing its effectiveness as a medium of
exchange. Money is no longer either an efficient
store of value or an efficient unit of account,
because this “ruler” with which we make our
measurements is continually changing.
Three points are clear. First, inflation is highly
undesirable. Second, governments have incentives
to abuse their power of mintage, which, coupled
with historical experience, has slowly created a
consensus among citizens that they cannot trust
their governments with unfettered control over
money. Third, the mechanisms people have con-
trived to protect themselves from the seemingly
arbitrary debasement of currency have varied
over time. 
The Gold Standard. For most of recorded
history, governments have taken some role in
providing money to the economy. In early times,
that role was limited to “authentication,” verify-
ing that coins contained the indicated metals.
Even in historical monarchies, however, the
authorities would occasionally lie to their people
about money. People’s dual reliance on, and
distrust of, government with regard to the value
of money is an age-old phenomenon. The view
that, despite all contrary assurances, governments
will eventually abuse their powers as counter-
feiters led countries to develop institutions aimed
at limiting a government’s ability to print addi-
tional money. One such method was the gold and
silver standards followed (on and off) by most
countries from 1821 to 1973.
Specie-backed currency took money out of
immediate government control. For example, if
the dollar were defined as equal to 1/20 of an
ounce of gold, then the number of dollars that the
United States could issue would be constrained by
its holdings of gold reserves. Moreover, if Britain
then defined its currency as to equal 5/20 of an
ounce of gold—as it did before World War I—the
exchange rate would be fixed at $5 per pound. If
either government issued more currency than
prescribed by its gold standard—say, to finance a
budget deficit—it would lose gold reserves to the
country with the more stable currency. In this way,
gold strengthened a government’s covenant with
its public not to erode the purchasing power of
its money. 
The unfortunate problem with a specie stan-
dard was that the value of money was only as
stable as the value of the specie backing it. This
led Benjamin Franklin to note that because “silver
itself is of no certain permanent Value, being worth
more or less according to its Scarcity or Plenty,
therefore it seems requisite to fix upon something
else, more proper to be made a Measure of Values”
(1729; italics in original). Although a specie stan-
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8 An appreciation of this role was evident in the thinking of
Thomas Jefferson, who confided to a friend: “There is, indeed, one
evil which awakens me at times, because it jostles me at every turn.
It is that we have now no measure of value. I am asked eighteen
dollars for a yard of broadcloth, which, when we had dollars, I used
to get for eighteen shillings; from this I can only understand that a
dollar is now worth two inches of broadcloth, but broadcloth is no
standard of value. I do not know, therefore, whereabouts I stand in
the scale of property, nor what to ask, or what to give for it” (1819).dard could clearly result in undesirable swings
in the purchasing power of money, the costs of
having a fiat currency were thought to be even
higher. In a letter to a friend, Madison stated: 
It cannot be doubted that a paper currency,
rigidly limited in its quantity to purposes
absolute necessary, may be equal and even
superior in value to specie. But experience
does not favor reliance on such experiments.
Whenever the paper has not been convertible
into specie, and its quantity has depended on
the policy of the Government, a depreciation
has been produced by an undue increase, or
an apprehension of it. (Madison, 1820)
Later, commenting on a “Report on a State’s
Bank,” Madison wrote, “But I am not yet weaned
from the opinion long entertained, that the only
adequate guarantee for the uniform and stable
value of a paper currency is its convertibility into
specie” (1831; emphasis added). Repeating his
view that a stable paper currency is theoretically
possible, doubts remained: “But what is to ensure
the inflexible adherence of the Legislative Ensurer
to their own principles and purposes?” (1831).
Madison left no doubt about what is essential: a
money that has stable value. His doubts about the
people’s elected representatives providing a stable
currency are reflected clearly in his adherence to
a specie standard, especially given his recognition
that paper money supplied by an honest govern-
ment is superior to a specie standard.
The quantity theorists of the late nineteenth
century, John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall,
also believed that, although a gold standard pro-
vided undesirable swings in currency value, it
was the only way for governments to provide a
stable paper currency. Mill observed: 
After experience had shown that pieces of
paper, of no intrinsic value, by merely bearing
upon them the written profession of being
equivalent to a certain number of francs, dol-
lars, or pound… governments began to think
that it would be a happy device if they could
appropriate to themselves this benefit… The
only question is, what determines the value
of such a currency…We have seen, however,
that even in the case of metallic currency, the
immediate agency in determining its value is
its quantity… The value, therefore of such a
currency is entirely arbitrary. (Mill, 1907;
emphasis added)
Citing the nineteenth-century economist,
William Jevons, Mill asserts, “so that the relation
of quantity to uses is the only thing which can give
value to fiat money.” That being the case, Mill
thought that convertibility (to metal) was the only
thing to prevent temptation to “depreciate the
currency without limit” (Mill, 1907). 
For the first 195 years following the
Declaration of Independence, most government
paper currencies were linked to specie. The U.S.
dollar was defined in terms of a weight of gold
(or occasionally silver). However, this did not
completely restrain governments from manipulat-
ing the value of their currencies. First, in order
to generate revenue, countries would frequently
abandon the gold standard during times of war.
Second, even without officially abandoning gold,
countries could and did periodically redefine the
value of their currencies in terms of gold. Instead
of allowing gold or foreign reserves to consistently
drain from their coffers, they would “be forced”
to devalue their currency.
At first glance, it would appear that a gold
standard provided no real discipline if countries
could devalue their currencies at will. The disci-
pline came from the fact that countries actually
could not do so without suffering a cost. If there
was a threat that a country would devalue its cur-
rency, massive speculative attacks would ensue
as investors attempted to shed themselves of that
currency. The devaluing country would eventually
lose massive amounts of foreign reserves (gold
and foreign currencies). Over 1966 and 1967, for
instance, Britain lost nearly 28 million ounces of
its gold reserves defending its currency and, on
a single day, November 17, 1967, lost reserves
valued at more than $1 billion.
The common wisdom is that the frequency
and destabilizing effects of such attacks caused
the Bretton Woods system, and thus the last vestige
of a gold standard, to be abandoned in 1973. While
this is correct on a superficial level, the underly-
ing cause was that, despite the threat of specula-
tive attacks, governments around the world were
unwilling to do what was necessary to maintain
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fiat money. Mises was blunt in his condemnation
of deliberate, governmentally engineered devalu-
ations of currency, and his criticism of the stated
as well as the unstated objectives of a devaluation
policy are as relevant today as when he wrote
Human Action over 50 years ago: “It is impossible
to take seriously the arguments advanced in favor
of devaluation” (1949, p. 790). 
Alternative Monetary Arrangements
Separation of the Central Bank and the
Treasury. Another way to keep governments
“honest” is to remove the power to inflate from
those with the most incentive to inflate. This is
achieved by making the central bank—which
has the power to inflate—highly independent of
the Treasury—which has the incentive to inflate.
This institutional structure is not a panacea but
has proven especially useful: Studies have shown
that countries where central banks are more inde-
pendent have lower inflation rates on average
(Alesina and Summers, 1993).
The high-inflation era of the 1970s showed
us what countries unfettered by fixed exchange
rates and a dollar convertible into gold will do
left on their own. Addressing this deficiency,
the U.S. Congress passed House Concurrent
Resolution 133 in 1975, requiring the Federal
Reserve to announce annual targets for monetary
growth rates. In 1978, the Full Employment and
Balanced Growth (Humphrey-Hawkins) Act was
passed, requiring the Federal Reserve to explain
these objectives and any deviations from them.
Most major central banks experimented with this
form of “instruments monitoring” in the 1970s
and 1980s, establishing growth rates for various
money measures in an effort to put boundaries
on the rate of inflation. 
Despite the relatively low inflation rates
realized by most industrial countries around the
world since 1983, the call for further institutional
constraints on central banks is growing. One
example is legislation enacted by New Zealand
and other countries that the sole objective of
central banks is to provide price stability.
Currency Boards. An institutional constraint
that has been adopted by smaller countries that
lack an established reputation for low inflation
is the currency board, similar to those initially
adopted by former colonies. The central idea
behind currency boards is to look more seriously
at the discipline provided by fixed exchange
rates. For example, in order to maintain a fixed
exchange rate between a small country and the
United States, the small country’s monetary policy
must, in essence, be dictated by the United
States. If the United States has the credibility to
maintain low inflation, the hope is that the
country with the currency board will also achieve
credibility over time. 
Currency boards are much like a small-scale
version of Bretton Woods except that there is no
longer a link between the dollar and gold to guar-
antee that the United States will follow a policy
of low inflation. Currency boards are probably
best described as small boats anchoring them-
selves to a large ship. Because the large ship is
not firmly anchored, the small countries are left
hoping that rough seas will not cause the large
ship and, thus, the small boats to drift too far off
course.
Private Currencies. Perhaps the most inter-
esting mechanism by which a stable currency
might be achieved was proposed by Hayek (1976)
in Denationalisation of Money (see also Friedman
and Schwartz, 1986). Although central banks,
currency boards, and the gold standard each
attempt to restrain a government’s tendency to
inflate, Hayek suggested that governments be
removed altogether from the provision of money.
He contended that if private currencies are
allowed to circulate freely, competition will
ensure that the value of these currencies will
remain constant. If any issuer attempts to collect
too much seigniorage by printing excessive
amounts of its currency, consumers will substitute
out of that currency into a competing currency
with a more stable purchasing power. The offend-
ing currency will cease to circulate as money.
Thus, currency issuers will have an incentive to
remain honest. 
Writing almost 30 years ago, Hayek was
clearly ahead of his time. His proposal that govern-
ments be completely removed from the business
of issuing money is not likely to come to fruition
in the near future. Nevertheless, his basic propo-
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incentive to keep people (or countries) honest is
relevant today. International currencies are
increasingly competing to become the currency
of choice. The rapid “dollarization” or “euroiza-
tion” in central Europe, the former Soviet Union,
and Latin America shows how a foreign currency
can become a legitimate substitute for a domestic
currency that has failed to maintain its value.
Paradoxically, it may be the end of fixed exchange
rates and the flawed discipline provided by that
system that have allowed internationally compet-
ing currencies to flourish.
Recent history teaches us that Hayek was
correct when he pointed out that 
Gresham’s law will apply only to different
kinds of money between which a fixed
exchange rate is enforced by law. With vari-
able exchange rates, the inferior-quality money
would be valued at a lower rate and, particu-
larly if it threatened to fall further in value,
people would try to get rid of it as quickly as
possible. The selection process would go on
towards whatever they regarded as the best sort
of money among those issued by the various
agencies [or countries], and it would rapidly
drive out money found inconvenient or worth-
less. (Hayek, 1976, p. 31)
Money, Taxes, and Deficits
Governments impose taxes on people in a
variety of ways but always on nominal money
prices and incomes. Consequently, debasement
of the currency always generates greater nominal
tax revenue for the taxing authorities. When tax
structures are progressive and not indexed, real
tax revenue rises when the average of money
prices of things rises—the value of a currency
erodes. Furthermore, much of the debt of govern-
ments is fixed in nominal money units. Thus,
debasement of the currency works to the advantage
of the governmental taxing and spending author-
ities. Government’s command over the economy’s
output rises while the government’s creditors are
repaid with reduced purchasing power. The effect
of these institutional arrangements is that the
relative share of the economy absorbed by the
government increases when the purchasing power
of a currency is declining.
Governments usually require that people’s tax
liabilities be disposed of by remitting liabilities
of the central bank to the account of the Treasury
at the central bank. When governments incur
deficits and issue debt, they are giving to security
holders the promise that they (or their successors)
will raise sufficient tax revenue in the future (or
issue new bonds) to repay the borrowed sums.
At times, the issuance of the debt instruments of
the government (increased supply of securities)
causes at least temporary downward pressure on
security prices (higher interest rates). If the policy
of the central bank is to maintain a fixed level of
market interest rates and accommodate all
demands for credit at that rate, the central bank
will passively expand its balance sheet—issue
greater quantities of currency and bank balances.
Without any corresponding increase in the public’s
desire to hold greater balances, the excess creation
of liabilities of the central bank will result in a
bidding up of the money prices of goods, services,
and other financial assets. This dynamic has been
common even when the central bank is prohibited
from directly purchasing the newly issued debt
instruments of the government.
Root Demands for Fiat Monies
As noted above, people throughout the world
use U.S. dollar notes in everyday commerce even
though their own governments also furnish a
currency. They use the U.S. currency even when
it is illegal to do so. If asked why they do so, they
will say it is simply because the value of the dollar
is more stable than other currencies. Two ques-
tions arise: Why isn’t the domestic currency stable,
and why is the value of the dollar more stable?
Both are fiat currencies, that is, their value is not
defined in terms of something else, such as gold.
Both may be legal tender in the home country,
but the U.S. dollar is legal tender in only a few
countries outside the United States.
So, why do money prices rise more rapidly
in terms of one currency than the other? The
answer can only be that some monetary authori-
ties create new units of their currency at a rate
that is faster, relative to demand to hold it, than
other monetary authorities do. Clearly, if the
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always exactly the amount there is, the purchas-
ing power of the currency can be neither rising
nor falling. A disturbance to this happy situation
can occur one of three ways: (i) people decide to
hold less (more) of the currency and the process
of ridding themselves of the excess (or acquiring
larger balances) causes money prices to adjust;
(ii) monetary authorities create money units at
faster (slower) rates than people want to add to
their holdings; (iii) favorable or unfavorable sur-
prises in the amount of things available to pur-
chase (natural disasters, crop failures, bumper
crops, etc.) cause changes in both relative prices
and the average of prices because the society is
richer or poorer.
The first possible disturbance—changes in
people’s desire to hold some of the currency—
raises questions about what goes into a decision
to hold any of a currency, especially if there is
an alternative available. The most fundamental
reason that inferior currencies continue to be held
even though a superior alternative is available is
that taxes must be paid to the domestic govern-
ments in units of the national currency. The
necessity to remit tax receipts in the form of the
liabilities of the national central bank ensures at
least some transitory demand for the currency.
Since there is a demand, it would be possible to
constrain the supply so that there is neither an
excess nor a deficient supply relative to the
demand. The reason most, if not all, prices of
things in terms of that currency rise is that the
monetary authorities do not constrain the new
supply to match the demand exactly. The usual
reason they do not do so is that the government
commits to disburse funds to people in amounts
that are greater than the sum of tax receipts and
proceeds from debt issuance.
Introduction of New Monies
There has never been a “phoenix-like” cur-
rency.9 Because the central role of money is mini-
mization of information and transaction costs,
people will not use an entity as money, a medium
of indirect exchange, if they have no prior expe-
rience upon which to base their expectations about
the prices of things expressed in terms of the pro-
posed money. Historically, then, new claims to
money (i.e., money substitutes) had to circulate
for a period of time sufficiently long to establish
a “track record” in the minds of people. Warehouse
receipts (such as gold certificates) were an early
type of paper claims to money that evolved into
paper fiat monies.
As described above, U.S. dollars were origi-
nally defined to be (and convertible into) specified
amounts of gold. For domestic purposes, dollars
became a fiat currency in 1933 when the govern-
ment made it illegal for American residents to own
gold. Nevertheless, for official, international pay-
ments made by one government to another, dollars
continued to represent claims to gold until the
early 1970s. For the past three decades, dollars
have been simply the liabilities of Federal Reserve
Banks.
In the second half of the twentieth century,
numerous currencies have been introduced by
governments. In every case, the new entity was
initially defined in terms of a known medium of
exchange. After World War II, the German
Deutsche mark was defined to be worth 1/4 of a
U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen was introduced
as 1/360 of a U.S. dollar at a time the dollar was
still defined as 1/35 of an ounce of gold. For over
25 years these currencies were claims to dollars
and, indirectly, to gold.
Newly liberated countries in the final decade
of the twentieth century introduced new curren-
cies but always defined in terms of, pegged to, and
convertible into other familiar national currencies,
such as U.S. dollars, Deutsche marks, British
pounds, or yen. When the domestic experience
with a currency has been favorable for sufficiently
long that confidence about future purchasing
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9 “The acceptance of a new kind of money presupposes that the
thing in question already has previous exchange value on account
of the services it can render directly to consumption or production.
Neither a buyer nor a seller could judge the value of a monetary
unit if he had no information about its exchange value—its pur-
chasing power—in the immediate past...A medium of exchange
without a past is unthinkable. Nothing can enter into the function
of a medium of exchange which was not already previously an
economic good and to which people assigned exchange value
already before it was demanded as such a medium” (Mises, 1949.
pp. 411, 426).power is high, governments have chosen to delink
(float) their nation’s money relative to foreign
currencies.
CENTRAL BANKS AND MONEY
The Tools of Monetary Policy
The tools available to central banks to influ-
ence the purchasing power of their currency are
quite few. Since it is their own liabilities that serve
as money, altering the size of the central bank’s
balance sheet is the essential monetary tool. The
assets of the balance sheet usually include loans
to banking companies and securities that may be
denominated in either the domestic currency or
a foreign currency. In either case, the securities
are mostly the obligations of the domestic or a
foreign government. Central banks can, if they
choose, control the size of their balance sheets
very precisely. That being the case, they can uni-
laterally determine the supply of central bank
money. The demand for central bank money has
several sources: Domestic (and maybe foreign)
households and businesses have a demand for the
notes issued by the central bank; and commercial
banking companies (and maybe others) hold
reserve or clearing balances at the central bank,
based on their business needs or legal reserve
requirements.
Since there is a demand for money from the
central bank and the potential to control the sup-
ply, monetary policies to stabilize the value of the
currency are possible. The difficulty is in estimat-
ing the demand by people to hold central bank
money. The domestic public’s desire to hold
notes issued by the central bank tends to grow in
proportion to incomes, although changes in the
forgone interest from investments can influence
currency demands (higher market interest rates
mean you hold less cash). Also, the commercial
banks’ demand for balances at the central bank
is a derived demand. The public’s demand for
checking-type accounts and other reservable
deposits at the financial intermediaries determines
the amounts of balances held at the central bank.
If some liabilities of banks, but not others, are sub-
ject to legal reserve requirements, shifts in the
public’s preferences between types of deposits
will affect the derived demand for balances at the
central bank. Similarly, if different sizes or types
of financial intermediaries are subject to different
legal reserve ratios, shifts in deposit balances
among the institutions will affect the derived
demand for central bank balances. In other words,
institutional arrangements affect the difficulty or
ease of estimating the demand for the liabilities
of the central bank. 
Where it is judged to be difficult to estimate
the demand for central bank money, the monetary
authorities typically target an overnight interest
rate at which they passively accommodate
increases and decreases in the demand for their
liabilities. While that ensures that there can be
neither an excess supply of nor an excess demand
for central bank money on an overnight basis, it
does not ensure secular10 stability in the purchas-
ing power of the currency.
The public’s desire to hold balances at the
depository intermediaries is influenced by several
factors—including the opportunity cost of forgone
returns on alternative assets,11 domestic as well
as foreign. This means changes in investment
opportunities as well as consumption plans influ-
ence the balances desired by businesses and
households. So, the changing yields on alternative
savings and investment assets have an indirect
effect on the demand for central bank liabilities.
Depending on the source of these changing yields,
the induced change in the outstanding stock of
central bank money may or may not be consistent
with maintaining stable purchasing power at the
initial overnight bank rate.
Knowing the prevailing operating procedures
of central banks is important for understanding
the risk of unintended increases or decreases in
the purchasing power of money. As mentioned
above, it is common for central banks to target an
Jordan
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2006 501
10 “Secular” means of, or relating to, a long term of indefinite
duration.
11 When the public holds money, they receive either no nominal
return on their cash, or very little—less than could be earned on
normal investments—on deposits in banks. It is in this sense that
we speak of there being an “opportunity cost” of holding money
(instead of holding interest-bearing investments).overnight interbank rate: The operating desk of
the central bank buys and sells (in the market)
securities previously issued by the government.
A purchase of securities by the central bank
increases12 the supply of central bank liabilities
while a sale of securities reduces the supply. In
effect, the operating desk sets a price at which it
is willing to buy (sell) securities from private
holders—the central bank’s demand for the debt
instruments of the government is unlimited at that
price (interest rate). If the market supply of secu-
rities to the central bank increases (the demand
by private holders for such securities decreases),
the quantity of central bank money will increase.
For example, if innovations in the economy
raise the perceived returns on real productive
capital (which can mean anything from better
management to new machines), there will be a
tendency for the interest rates offered on financial
instruments to rise as well.13 There will be both
an increase in the demand for loanable funds
(money borrowed from a bank) and a decrease in
the demand to hold fixed-rate instruments such
as government securities. The higher return on
financial assets means a higher opportunity cost
of holding bank notes or low-yielding balances in
banks. This will foster a decline in the quantity
demanded as people and businesses seek to reduce
the amount of money they hold. Other things being
held the same, if the central bank’s operating
procedure involves pegging a nominal overnight
interest rate, the marketplace forces pressing down
on security prices (up on interest rates) will be
met by an expansion in the stock of central bank
money, even though the amount of money
demanded is declining!
Temporarily, the expansion of the supply of
central bank money reduces the upward pressure
on market interest rates even though an excess
supply of money has been created (increased
supply and falling quantity demanded). Under
such circumstances, the excess supply of such
monies will cause purchasing power to erode as
the weighted average of money prices that are
rising will exceed the weighted average of prices
that are falling. The adjustment process—infla-
tion—will continue (i) until the returns on real
productive capital fall to the initial lower level
or are brought down to that level by the inflation
tax or (ii) until the central bank raises the pegged
level of the overnight bank rate to the point where
the amount of central bank money demanded is
the amount outstanding.
Conversely, if diminished economic prospects
are reducing perceived yields on productive
capital—or are causing a general preference for
more liquidity in the form of secure bank deposits
and other low-risk financial instruments—security
prices will be bid up (market interest rates will
be bid down) and the lower forgone yields will
cause people to try to increase their holdings of
bank deposits and currency. That means greater
demand for central bank money; but the only
source is the central bank. If the monetary author-
ities do not correctly analyze these fundamental
economic forces and they fail to lower the nominal
overnight intervention rate, the operating desk of
the central bank will be selling (or buying fewer)
securities and the central bank balance sheet will
shrink (supply goes down) or grow too slowly at
a time when the amount of central bank money
demanded is rising. In time, the weighted average
of money prices that are falling will exceed the
weighted average of prices that are rising until
people want to hold balances that are consistent
with the amount of central bank money in circu-
lation. This process, deflation, results in a general
rise in the purchasing power of money. 
The critical element, then, in the formulation
of monetary policy actions is ascertaining the
forces at work in the economy that are tending to
press upward or downward on the structure of
market interest rates, including the perceived
yields on real productive capital. Since observed
interest rates in a world of fiat money include an
“inflation premium,” market rates will change
because people come to expect the average of
money prices to rise at a faster or slower rate while
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12 When the central bank purchases a security from the general public
(usually a bank), it pays money for the security. This money is a
liability of the central bank, an increase in money held by the
public, and, of course, a reduction in the number of securities
held by the public.
13 Higher expected rewards to real productive capital cause people
to buy more of the new productive assets. As they do so, they seek
to reduce their holdings of old financial assets. This will cause the
price of the old assets to fall, which in turn raises their yield.the expected yields on real productive capital
may be changing simultaneously in the same or
opposite direction. Sifting through the variety of
forces at work is essential in making judgments
about the appropriate level for the overnight bank
rate when deciding on the prices at which govern-
ment securities will be bought or sold.14
Talking about Monetary Policy
Popular usage by “Fed watchers” of the
expression “monetary policy” is quite different
from the way it is used in this essay. Even quali-
fiers such as monetary policy objectives and
monetary policy actions usually require elabora-
tion in order to be clear. At least one dictionary
definition of policy is “a high-level overall plan
embracing the general goals and acceptable pro-
cedures, especially of a government body.” Yet,
the most frequent references we see in the daily
press about monetary policy include characteri-
zations of policy as “tight” or “easy” or claims
that the monetary authorities are going to “tighten”
or “loosen” monetary policy. How can a “high-
level overall plan” be characterized as tight or
easy? Maybe it is fair to characterize the actions
to achieve the objectives as being “tighter” or
“easier” (than previously?), but it certainly is not
appropriate to talk about the objectives as being
tight or easy.
Even the most avid “fine tuner” of monetary
policy has a long-term objective in mind, and
people who share the same objective may differ
on the appropriate tactics to be successful. Exces-
sive focus on the short-term actions to implement
a policy runs the risk of confusing observers
regarding the ultimate objective. If observers do
not know the intended destination, or do not agree
with the destination, they will naturally second-
guess the appropriateness of course corrections.
If the ultimate objective is well understood—
and agreed to—it is reasonable to hold policy-
makers accountable for actual results. Good
intentions are not enough if the results are bad.
However, the results can be judged as successful
or not relative only to what was intended. Without
understanding and agreement about objectives,
there is no way for accountability to be tied to
performance.
The fact that there are long and variable lags
before monetary policies take effect means that
objectives must be stated in a multi-year context.15
If the time horizons of the policymakers and the
observers differ, it may be difficult to get agree-
ment on appropriate weights to give to any tran-
sition costs when compared with the benefits of
progress toward achieving the ultimate objective.
As a result, disagreements about the appropriate-
ness of a specific policy action may reflect nothing
more than differences in the preferred time path
to the destination. All that gets lost in the familiar
chatter about whether the policy action represents
“tightening” or “loosening.”
The Formulation and Implementation
of Monetary Policy
The consumption behavior of households
tends to reflect expectations about their longer-
term ability to consume. This phenomenon has
been called the life-cycle hypothesis, standard
or standardized income, and, of course, by Milton
Friedman, permanent income (Friedman, 1957).
The basic idea is familiar. Transitory changes in
measured income or cash flow fluctuate around
some longer-term average; household consump-
tion behavior does not fully reflect these transi-
tory changes in the short run. Sharp increases in
measured cash-flow income are not fully reflected
in corresponding increases in current consump-
tion; nor are sudden rapid declines in measured
cash-flow income reflected in corresponding
declines in consumption spending.
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14 See the discussion of targeting interest rates in 
www.clevelandfed.org/Annual01/essay.htm.
15 The time it takes monetary policy to influence the other macro-
economic variables such as nominal and real output and the rate
of change of prices is known as the lag. Sometimes the lag is short
and sometimes it is long. It differs as a function of people’s expec-
tations. After a period of no inflation, people tend to interpret an
increase in prices as temporary and not necessarily a permanent
price increase. After a period of rapid inflation, they interpret an
increase in prices as more inflation. How quickly people adjust to
changes in policy is related to their experience and their underly-
ing conception of why changes are taking place. It is in the sense
that lags depend upon past experience and what people see as
causing the changes that we say that policy lags are long and vari-
able—depending on experience.Changing Productivity. Both the theoretical
framework and empirical observations tradition-
ally suggest that permanent income is relatively
steady, while transitory changes in measured
income are more variable. However, it can also
be the case that periods of rising or falling pro-
ductivity and changes in the pace of technological
innovation produce a generalized perception that
permanent income is rising or falling relative to
measured or cash-flow income. People may come
to form these expectations in a variety of ways.
Rising Productivity. Sustained periods of
steady employment and growing paychecks may
lead people to expect that not only has their real
standard of living risen but that it will continue
to rise in the future, possibly at a faster rate than
previously expected. Or, they may come to expect
fewer or shorter periods of unemployment. Or,
they may observe that their 401K savings plans
or defined-contribution retirement programs now
promise a higher future stream of income than
previously thought. In a variety of ways, people
come to expect that they will be able to consume
more in the present, as well as in the future, than
they previously thought.
As a result of any (or some combination) of
these various forces at work in a “new economy,”
households perceive that their long-term ability
to consume is higher.16 The availability of credit
means that people can increase their spending in
anticipation of the future increase in their incomes.
This, in turn, means households will consume a
greater share of their current measured income
so, consequently, the contemporaneous personal
saving rate will fall. Clearly, this analysis suggests
that, in such an environment, a low or even neg-
ative saving rate is unavoidable and is not a prob-
lem to be addressed by economic policies.
In the business or entrepreneurial sector, rising
productivity and an enhanced pace of technologi-
cal innovation mean that the marginal efficiency
of capital is higher.17 Consequently, in return for
giving up consumption today, relatively more will
be available for consumption tomorrow. Real
interest rates rise as new opportunities bring a
higher rate of return on new business investment.
These higher real interest rates are not a matter
of policy choice or of anyone’s discretion. Rather
they are a manifestation of economic forces that
result in better uses for available productive
resources. With households and businesses both
increasing their claims on current productive
resources, real interest rates must rise in compet-
itive markets.
Gold Standard. Higher real interest rates
need not imply higher nominal interest rates.
Just to exclude complications for the moment,
consider the case under a gold standard. Increased
productivity growth and technological innova-
tion in an environment of monetary stability
implied by a gold standard means that the price
level falls. That is, output of goods and services
increases because of higher productivity but the
quantity of money—gold—remains in relatively
fixed supply. Thus, the purchasing power of
money rises in the face of greater productivity.
The falling price level means that greater perma-
nent real income can be distributed to society
with the same level of nominal income. The
falling price level also implies that unchanged
nominal interest rates, or possibly even lower
nominal interest rates, correspond to higher real
interest rates. These higher real rates are the
essential market mechanism by which competi-
tion between consumers and investors rations
present consumption against augmented future
consumption. But, we’re not on a gold standard.
Fiat Money. The alternative to commodity
money, as we have seen, is “managed money,”
a discretionary monetary policy regime using a
procedure that “pegs” the interest rate. The
upward pressure on real interest rates that is a
necessary consequence of greater productivity
and the faster pace of technological innovation
initially will put upward pressure on nominal,
i.e., market, interest rates. Greater and greater
injections of central bank money will then be
necessary to keep the pegged level of the nomi-
nal overnight interbank rate unchanged. Rising
market interest rates mean that the opportunity
cost of holding money balances is rising. That,
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16 In economists’ jargon, they have moved to a higher indifference
curve.
17 Again, in economists’ jargon, the production possibility boundary
has both shifted out and changed its shape.in turn, means the quantity of money demanded
declines and the rate at which money changes
hands increases as households and businesses
seek to rid themselves of undesired money hold-
ings. This combination of excess money holdings
and the faster growth of central bank money
means that a higher rate of nominal final demand
growth would be accommodated by a more
expansionary rate of money growth. Again, too
much money chasing after too few goods. In such
an environment, the increase in nominal interest
rates, while initially reflecting upward pressure
on real interest rates, would be augmented by a
rising inflation premium. The overnight inter-
bank rate would be under persistent upward
pressure so long as it continued to lag behind
market-determined interest rates.
This dynamic process describes an environ-
ment in which acceleration in the pace of techno-
logical innovation and productivity growth could
inadvertently become an inflationary process. A
central bank’s actions to maintain an unchanged
overnight rate would accommodate nominal price
increases by failing to accommodate increases in
the real interest rate. As a result, credit markets
would be unable to play their role in rationing
available real productive resources amongst
heightened competing demands that reflect the
increased return to real capital. Of course, this
analysis is symmetric: A sustained deceleration
of the pace of technological innovation and pro-
ductivity growth would imply a fall in the equi-
librium real rate and a necessity to reduce the
central bank’s intervention rate in order to avoid
a procyclical downward thrust of monetary
injections.
Policy Neutrality
In the analysis above, “real interest rates”
refer to inflation-adjusted nominal interest rates,
that is, anticipated yields on an investment after
allowing for changes in the purchasing power of
money. For example, the rate of inflation that is
expected over the life of a bond is subtracted from
the nominal yield to obtain the real yield.
Sometimes one hears or reads references to
the “real federal funds rate” or “real overnight
interbank rate.” This makes no sense. Because
there is no meaningful one-day inflation rate,
there is no statistical measure of anticipated
changes in the purchasing power of money in a
single day that can be used to measure a real
return for one day.
As an alternative to referencing “real interest
rates,” economists employ a concept of a “natural
rate of interest.” While this natural rate cannot
be observed, the forces that would tend to cause
cyclical or secular increases or decreases would
include such factors as the changing productiv-
ity trends and pace of technological innovation
discussed above. Sometimes the natural rate is
associated with the average rate of real output
growth over long periods. Demographic patterns,
political and economic institutional arrangements,
and even geopolitical developments will also
influence this “natural” rate.
One thing that does not influence the natural
rate is the overnight, interbank rate targeted by
central banks. It is simply impossible for central
banks to “push up” or “hold down” market interest
rates. However, actions by the central bank to
target an overnight intervention rate in the face
of sometimes strong pressures at work on market
interest rates have a major impact on the perform-
ance of an economy over time.
As defined above, a world without inflation
is one in which people make decisions in the
confident expectation that all observed changes
in money prices of goods, services, and assets are
changes in relative prices, and all observed changes
in interest rates are changes in real rates. That is,
the “inflation premium” in nominal interest rates
is zero, so only those forces that influence the
natural rate of interest are causing changes in
market interest rates.
A neutral monetary policy would be one in
which injections of liquidity by the central bank
are faster or slower as necessary to maintain this
non-inflationary environment. When forces are
at work to raise the natural rate of interest, actions
to peg the intervention rate at an unchanged level
would require larger and larger injections of cen-
tral bank money. However, as described above,
in that same environment the quantity of money
people want to hold idle is declining. Increasing
supply and falling demand is not neutral.
Jordan
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2006 505To remain neutral, the intervention rate tar-
geted by the central bank must rise in concert
with a rising natural rate. Likewise, if the pace of
technological advance and productivity growth
slows, it is necessary to reduce the intervention
target rate in order to maintain the neutral stance.
These dynamics show that changes in the targeted
intervention rate cannot be taken as indications
of the “tightness” or “easiness” of the thrust of
policy. The mere observation that the announced
target rate has been increased or decreased does
not indicate that the stance of policy actions is
more “stimulative” or “restrictive.”
On the contrary, failure to change the target
rate in concert with forces influencing the natural
rate would mean that policy actions have become,
de facto, more or less expansionary. The paradox,
then, is that maintaining neutrality of the thrust
of monetary policy actions requires changes in the
announced target intervention rate as frequently
as policymakers obtain information indicating
that the natural rate of interest has risen or fallen.
COMPETING CURRENCIES
The concepts of competitive money, currency
boards, and the independence of the central bank
were no doubt far from the mind of Abraham
Lincoln when he spoke of the government’s obli-
gation to provide a stable currency. However, these
are a few of the mechanisms by which govern-
ments have tried to achieve this end. It must be
remembered, however, that these different options
are not independent.
The potential for the forces of competition
that have served market economies so well to
discipline a country’s ability to print money freely
is particularly promising. According to Hayek,
“[i]t might prove to be nearly as difficult for a
democratic government not to interfere with
money as to regulate it sensibly” (1976, p. 74;
emphasis added). He argues that countries around
the world should abolish “any kind of exchange
control or regulation of the movement of money
between countries” and provide “the full freedom
to use any of the currencies for contracts and
accounting” (1976, p. 74). Further, there should
be “the opportunity for any bank located in these
countries to open branches in any other on the
same terms as established banks” (1976, p. 17).
Laws could be changed in various ways in
the United States to foster more effective compe-
tition. For example, federal law (Title 31, Section
5103) states that “United States coins and currency
(including Federal Reserve notes…) are legal
tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and
dues. Foreign gold and silver coins are not legal
tender for debts.” This law might be altered so
that contracts written in terms of foreign or alter-
native domestic monetary units, including specie,
could compete with dollars. Almost 30 years ago,
the British House of Lords “ruled that in English
courts, foreign creditors could now have their
claims recognized in their own currencies” (The
Financial Times, 1975). 
Governments must have a role in the enforce-
ment of contracts. As Mises observed in Human
Action, the laws and courts of a country
define what the parties to the contract had in
mind when speaking of a sum of money…They
have to determine what is and what is not legal
tender. In attending to this task the laws and
the courts do not create money [emphasis in
original]…In the unhampered market economy
the laws and the judges in attributing legal
tender quality to a certain thing merely estab-
lish what, according to the usages of trade, was
intended by the parties when they referred in
their deal to a definite kind of money” [empha-
sis added]. (Mises, 1949, p. 780)
Legislation requiring enforcement of “specific
performance” by the courts would increase the
opportunity for currency competition. Currently,
in most countries of the world, when there is a
dispute involving a contract that is stated in terms
of a currency or unit (such as gold) other than the
national currency, courts will not require perform-
ance in the stated unit but will require that an
“equivalent payment” in the national currency
be paid.
Money in the twenty-first century will surely
prove to be as different from the money of the
past century as that money was from that of the
nineteenth century. Just as fiat money replaced
specie-backed paper currencies, electronically
initiated debits and credits will become the dom-
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private money to compete with government-issued
currencies. Such competition between private and
governmental monies may help countries around
the world to finally live up to Lincoln’s challenge
of fulfilling “the duty [government] owes the
people, of furnishing them a sound and uniform
currency.”
SUMMARY
Stable money enhances growth. Whenever the
purchasing power of money is falling (the impact
on the weighted average of all prices from those
that are rising exceeds that of those that are falling)
productivity improvements are smaller. The faster
the average of prices rise, the slower the produc-
tivity improvements. This result is unavoidable
because the changes in money prices of goods and
factors of production do not accurately reflect
changes in relative values. Consequently, busi-
nesses and households make mistakes that they
would not have made if they could be confident
that all observed price changes are the result of
shifts in the supply of, or demand for, some things
rather than other things. Furthermore, when the
value of money is not stable, changes in interest
rates are not necessarily changes in real interest
rates. To the extent that changes in interest rates
reflect uncertainty about the future purchasing
power of money, mistakes in the allocation of
resources occur.
The most common forms of money in use in
the world today are the liabilities of central banks.
The almost universal requirement that taxes be
paid to governments in the form of the liabilities
of a central bank ensures that there is a demand
for such liabilities. However, to some extent the
demand for central bank liabilities is a derived
demand, dependent on people’s usage of the lia-
bilities of financial intermediaries such as banks.
Institutional arrangements such as interest pro-
hibitions or ceilings and idle reserve requirements
can affect the demand for central bank liabilities,
making the amount demanded at any time difficult
to estimate. 
Central banks control the supply of central
bank money by acquiring or disposing of securi-
ties, usually those issued by a sovereign govern-
ment. In effect, central banks choose levels of
nominal interest rates at which they have a hori-
zontal demand for the liabilities of the govern-
ment. If they guess correctly, the rate at which
private holders supply securities to the central
bank will generate additional central bank liabil-
ities at the same rate as businesses and households
desire to add to their holdings (indirect in the
case of “inside money,” the deposit liabilities of
financial intermediaries). The value of money is
stable when there is neither an excess supply of
nor an excess demand for the liabilities of the
central bank.
When the public’s supply of securities to the
central bank changes, the growth rate of central
bank liabilities also changes. If the public’s demand
(direct and indirect) for central bank liabilities is
not changing in the same direction and by the
same amount, the average purchasing power of
money (the weighted average of the prices of goods
and services) will rise or fall as people seek to dis-
pose of excess, or acquire additional, obligations
of the central bank. Such adjustments alter relative
prices and induce resource reallocations! Unavoid-
ably, then, output potential is temporarily reduced.
Maximum output—and highest standards of liv-
ing—is achieved only when the purchasing power
of money is stable. 
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The American “Dollar” and Other Monetary Terms
Just what is a “dollar” anyway? Everyone knows what gold is; they know what silver is; or at least
there are some guys in the lab who will tell us the gold or silver content of any piece of metal. But a
“dollar”? We have pieces of paper saying “one dollar” and other pieces of paper saying more dollars.
We have stocks and bonds that are quoted as being traded for so many dollars and everyone keeps getting
bills from the electric company, the gas company, and the IRS to send them so many dollars. Fortunately,
employers have agreed to give us some dollars every month. Now, if we can just keep a balance between
the number of dollars our employer promises to give us each month (assuming we can trust him) and
the number of dollars all kinds of people say we must turn over to them—or we’ll hear from their
lawyers—we’ll be okay.
Back to the beginning. What is this thing called a “dollar” that some people promise to give us and
other people insist that we give to them? Well, it turns out that some valley in the Bohemian part of what
we now call the Czech Republic has a lot to do with it. There, coins were made out of metal to help people
make indirect exchanges between what they produced and what they wanted. The German word for
valley is thal and it was common to refer to the metal coins produced in the valley as taler coins (the
“h” being silent in German). That was often shortened to simply talers. In English, taler coins or talers
sounded like dollar coins, or simply dollars, which was how the British referred to some metal coins
made in Spain. 
After the Spanish staked their claims on large chunks of the “new world,” they started getting boat
loads of gold and silver and stamping out a lot of coins. The Spanish monetary unit at the time was the
real, and an eight-reales coin—a “piece of eight”—was referred to by English-speakers as a “dollar.”
The American colonists kept their accounts in British pounds, shillings, and pence but they did not
have available to them very many British coins. What they had mostly were Spanish and Portuguese
coins, and the most common coin available to them was the Spanish “dollar” coin. Other coins available
were the Spanish doubloon and pistole, the Portuguese moidore and johannes, and the French guinea
and pistole. (Compared with these alternatives, we are fortunate that the coins the colonists had most
of were Spanish dollars.)
Because the proportion of precious metal in all these coins varied and the colonists kept their books
in terms of British pounds, it was necessary to define each of the various other metal coins in terms of
British pounds. Keeping pounds as the unit of account but using Spanish dollars as the dominant medium
of exchange was, of course, a very cumbersome arrangement. As British subjects, however, the colonists
did not have a good alternative.
After the Declaration of Independence, it finally became opportune to think about a unique monetary
system appropriate to the newly evolving nation. It seems that Thomas Jefferson quite pragmatically
concluded that, since the most familiar coin in use was the Spanish dollar coin, it would be best to
adopt a “dollar” as a standard. That meant a dollar had to be defined in terms of something of known
value—other than British pounds. He also concluded that since “every schoolboy” could multiply and
divide by ten, it would be best to have money units that were in terms of tenths of a dollar and multiples
of ten dollars. Jefferson found the British use of eighths of a money unit to be cumbersome, at best. So,
even though the Spanish had minted a “dollar coin” to be a “piece of eight” (consisting of eight reales),
the colonists ultimately defined a dollar coin to be 24.75 grains of pure gold or 371.25 grains of pure
silver. They further decided to mint a ten-dollar gold coin as well as a one-dollar gold piece and a one-
dollar silver piece, and to mint silver coins of one-tenth of a dollar and copper coins of one-hundredth
of a dollar.
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of something of known value. Only gradually during the twentieth century did people come to accept
that the word “dollar” stood in its own right as a concept of value. In other words, for almost 200 years
a dollar was a claim to money—gold—and formally became money only in 1973 when the link to gold
was severed.
A Dollar as Money Is Distinct from Assets Denominated in Dollars
Currently, there is only one source of dollars: the liabilities of Federal Reserve Banks. Everything
else is a substitute for, or claim to, dollars. Actual dollars come in two forms: Federal Reserve notes and
balances (deposits) at Reserve Banks that are maintained by depository institutions, such as a commercial
bank. All transactions using Federal Reserve notes are final, certain, immediate, and (often) anonymous.
That is why people like using them. Although you do not see it directly, all taxes paid by households
and businesses to the federal government must be in the form of a transfer of ownership of balances held
at a Federal Reserve Bank to the account of the U.S. Treasury at the Federal Reserve Banks.
People commonly exchange promises to pay and receive certain amounts of dollars at definite times
in the future (bonds). Ultimately, the payor is giving a promise (which the courts will enforce) to acquire
and deliver to the payee a certain number of Federal Reserve Bank notes or bank balances denominated
in dollars (that are claims to balances at the Federal Reserve Banks) at a certain date in the future.
Consequently, only dollars serve the function of money—indirect exchange—in the United States.
Claims to money—such as balances at financial intermediaries (banks and so on)—are a part of the
monetary system. Yet, it is important to distinguish between various stores of wealth (mainly, financial
assets) that are denominated in units of money and the entity that serves as money. The purchasing
value of the dollar, for example, is not influenced by the aggregate “dollar value” of equity markets,
debt markets, money-market funds, foreign-held “eurodollar” balances, or any other instruments that
are specified in legal contracts to pay and receive dollars.
Some Monetary Terms
Coin metal tokens used as media of exchange, either full-bodied (i.e., containing the amount of
precious metal indicated by the standard) or merely representational (like paper notes)
Currency (i) name of a unit of account, e.g., “dollar,” “pound,” “yen”; (ii) paper notes used as a
medium of exchange
Monetary standard the (legal) (official) definition of the value of a currency in terms of something
else, like, e.g., gold, silver, or the discretion of the government (fiat) 
Dollar (i) liability of Federal Reserve Banks; (ii) U.S. unit of account and medium of final exchange;
(iii) U.S. legal tender—a judicially enforceable right to receive payment or compensation in a certain
currency
Indirect exchange interpersonal exchange of goods or services that employs an intermediate entity
(money) rather than direct barter of final consumables
Money (i) standard of value; (ii) media of exchange used in indirect exchange; (iii) that entity that
economizes best on the use of other real resources in gathering information about relative values and
conducting transactions
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